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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Many new anticancer drugs enter the market at a relatively high price.  Some healthcare 
authorities have made the rare decision not to fund new anticancer drugs due to their high 
prices.   Decision-makers fear that these expensive new anticancer drugs are not 
generating net social benefits.  The following work investigates the relationship between 
prices and clinical benefits of anticancer drugs that have come to market over the past 
decade.  We show that the relationship between drug prices and clinical benefits is not 
linear.  In fact, modern drug prices appear to rise exponentially.  Drug manufacturers 
explain their pricing strategy with concerns towards the high cost of innovating in the 
pharmaceutical industry.  Accordingly, a discussion of innovation in anticancer research is 
included. The discussion also provides insight into cancer control in the upcoming 
generation of personalized medicines. The aim is to gain an understanding of the social 
benefits received from these innovative new treatments. 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: anticancer drugs, innovation, pharmaceuticals, pricing, healthcare, 
personalized medicines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  iv 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
• Chapter One is an introduction to the concept of social benefits and the 
marketplace for new anticancer drugs.  A brief discussion of the methods used to 
evaluate new therapeutic interventions in healthcare markets is included, as these 
tools commonly demonstrate the value of new anticancer drugs. 
• In Chapter Two, we trace the history of cancer chemotherapy and the social 
benefits that anticancer drugs have provided in the past.  
• In Chapter Three, we investigate the changes in clinical benefits for breast cancer 
drugs over time.  We then correlate the clinical benefits with the prices charged for 
these new treatments.  A similar analysis was done in Chapter Four, for drugs 
developed against colorectal cancer over the past decade.   
• The information in Chapters Three and Four was used to establish a price-benefit 
relationship for anticancer drugs against breast and colorectal cancers.  We find 
that there is a steep increase in the price of these drugs relative to their clinical 
benefit. 
• Because the value of anticancer drugs includes both clinical and non-clinical 
benefits, we also discuss the non-clinical benefits of anticancer drugs in Chapter 6.  
The context of this concluding chapter is of future anticancer drugs in the era of 
personalized medicines. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
adjuvant 
therapy 
Additional treatment to enhance the chances for a successful outcome.  This 
might include chemotherapy after surgical removal of a tumor to ensure the 
complete removal of all cancerous cells. 
CRC Colorectal Cancer 
DFS Disease Free Survival. Surrogate endpoint for overall survival.  Usually 
used in the adjuvant setting where treatments aim to prevent recurrence of 
the disease. 
High cost 
drugs 
A recent cohort of drugs that have an unprecedented high price associated 
with them 
HR Hazard Ratio. A term used to describe the relative risk reduction achieved by 
taking the treatment.  An HR less than 1 indicates that the therapy offers 
some improvement over comparators  
metastatic Stage of pathological progression of cancer.  The disease has spread from 
its primary tissue location to other sites in the body. 
NICE National Center for Health and Clinical Excellence.  British authority that 
appraises new drugs for cost-effectiveness and makes recommendations for 
their use for local health authorities. 
OS Overall Survival.  Clinical outcome for estimating a drugs benefit against 
cancer 
PMPRB Patented Medicines Pricing Review Board, a quasi-judicial organization 
designed to manage Canadian drug pricing and protect consumers from 
excessively high pricing of pharmaceuticals. 
TTP Time to progression.  Surrogate endpoint for overall survival.  Used 
commonly for drug candidates seeking “fast-track” approval. 
QALY Quality Adjusted Life Years.   A way to measure the quality and quantity of 
live lived when evaluating therapeutic interventions. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
This project concerns the benefits that new anticancer drugs offer to society (i.e. their 
social benefits). The goal is to gain more information about the level of social benefits that 
these anticancer drugs have generated over time.  We do so by calculating the change in 
prices of anticancer drugs over the past decade.   We then relate the rise in drug prices to 
the level of clinical benefits that these drugs generate.   If drug prices are much higher 
than the level of clinical benefits that they offer, then the level of social benefits received 
from these drugs may not be optimal. We also discuss non-clinical benefits, such as the 
social value of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. The purpose of this project is to 
provide information about the value that these highly priced drugs have to society. 
 
1.1 The Benefit of Modern Anticancer Drugs 
 
 
Anticancer drugs have made significant advancements in recent years (Garattini and 
Betele 2002).  These advancements often translate into improved health benefits for 
cancer patients.  Recently, however, the high prices that the manufacturers charge for 
these new drugs has become a social concern (Rawlins 2007).  Many healthcare decision-
makers question whether these expensive new drugs offer net social benefits that justify 
their high price (McManus 2007).  It is important to consider how anticancer drugs benefit 
society in aggregate when addressing this question. 
Thirty years ago, patients with metastatic colorectal cancer had a 50% chance of 
surviving for five years after they were initially diagnosed with the disease (Ries et al 
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2006a).  Today, these patients have a 65% chance of survival.  Similarly, breast cancer 
patients now have a much greater chance of surviving the disease than they did in the 
1970s (Ries et al 2006b). These improvements are directly attributable to the availability 
of new anticancer drugs (Schrag 2004; Chia et al 2007).  Several forms of cancer are even 
considered curable because of these new drugs (FHCRC 2008).  Clearly, cancer patients 
are the direct beneficiaries of anticancer drugs.  
The Canadian Institute for Cancer estimates that one in three people will be 
stricken with some form of cancer during their life (Brodsky et al 2004). With such a high 
incidence rate, the disease directly or indirectly affects almost every member of society.  
The friends, family, or caregivers of cancer patients may also share in the benefits offered 
by new anticancer drugs.   How do we decide which treatments offer the most benefits to 
society in aggregate?  
One early indicator of the potential total benefits of these new drugs is their efficacy 
in clinical trials.  Demonstration of efficacy is the first step towards establishing proof that 
a new drug will benefit cancer patients and society. The outcomes from clinical trials form 
the initial basis of most regulatory approval decisions. All new drugs must achieve 
regulatory approval before their release to the market.  This first demonstration of clinical 
efficacy also contributes to the process of deciding if healthcare programs will adopt the 
drug.    
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1.2 The Net Social Benefits of Anticancer Drugs 
 
In allocating scarce resources, healthcare decision-makers must factor in both the clinical 
benefits as well as the non-clinical benefits of new drugs.  Indirect or non-clinical benefits 
may include the drug’s ability to enhance a patient’s quality of life or prevent disease in 
the long-term (Brouwer et al 2001).  Other indirect benefits, such as protecting the ability 
of an individual to earn an income and consume goods and services, may also factor into 
decisions regarding the adoption of new drugs into healthcare systems (Wu 1980). 
Intuitively, the greatest net social benefits occur when the costs to produce a given 
drug are low and the benefits received from it are high (Vining and Wiemer 2006).  Figure 
1 illustrates this basic point, showing a number of different levels of net social benefits 
(NSBG and NSBL) derived from a drug produced at two different cost levels (Ci and Ce).  
When the difference between total costs and total benefits is large, the drug provides 
greater net social benefit (NSBG).  Holding all else constant, the greatest difference 
between costs and benefits occurs when a given drug production technology is efficient 
and therefore follows an efficient cost curve (Ce). Lower net social benefits (NSBL) will 
be realized when the drug is produced with inefficient methods that raises the whole cost 
curve (Ci) (Vining and Weimer 2006).  It also makes sense to select the optimum output 
level for a drug such that net social benefits are maximized (NSBG), rather than any other 
output level. 
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Figure 1. Maximizing Net Social Benefits 
Source: Adapted from (Vining and Weimer 2006) 
 
Given declining marginal benefits (a typical situation) and increasing marginal 
costs (again, a typical situation), there is a point where the total social benefits received 
from an anticancer drug or a portfolio of drugs will reach a maximum.  Current research 
supports the belief that incremental gains in clinical benefits are diminishing for new 
anticancer drugs (Grabowski 2004).  This may be a sign that the net social benefits of the 
anticancer drugs are nearing their maximum possible value.  DiMasi and colleagues also 
show that the cost of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry is rising at a high rate 
(7.4% above inflation per year) (DiMasi et al 2003). 
Recent empirical evidence has confirmed that drug prices are directly related to 
their therapeutic advancements (Lu and Comanor 1998; Ekelund and Persson 2003).  
Some fear that increased marginal costs may also serve to indicate that the high prices of 
new anticancer drugs are simply a way for drug companies to retain high profits (Brandes 
B 
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Quantity of Anticancer Drugs Produced 
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Benefits  
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Total  
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NSBG 
NSBL 
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2007). Certainly, experts now believe that the price of new anticancer drugs is about 300 
times the price of anticancer drugs introduced in the 1980s (Schrag 2004). 
 
1.3 Information Exchange in Healthcare Markets 
 
Rising pharmaceutical prices are problematic because pharmaceutical manufacturers and 
healthcare decision-makers have conflicting interests.  Pharmaceutical manufacturers have 
the main interest of earning profits from the sale of new drugs and thus favor high drug 
prices.  Profits from sales are re-invested in research and development. This investment 
effectively leads to the innovation of future drugs (Grabowski 2002). In contrast, 
healthcare decision-makers have the interest of minimizing healthcare costs and oppose 
high drug prices.  A conceptual understanding of healthcare markets is necessary to 
appreciate the impact that highly priced drugs have on healthcare systems.  
Healthcare markets differ from competitive markets because of the way that 
information flows between supplier and consumer, as shown in Figure 21.  In between the 
primary medical suppliers (i.e. pharmaceutical manufacturers), are various regulators, 
such as the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and financial regulators, such as 
health insurers and agents (pharmacists or physicians). The flow of information in 
healthcare markets is through these intermediate regulators, with many stakeholders 
involved.    
                                                
1 For a discussion of market failures in healthcare, see Donaldson, C., and Gerard, K. (1989). "Countering 
moral hazard in public and private health care systems: a review of recent evidence." Journal of Social 
Policy 18(2): 235-251. 
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Because the flow of information is indirect, via intermediary regulators, the rate 
and direction of innovation from pharmaceutical manufacturers is tightly controlled.  For 
example, governmental regulators use the Orphan Drug Policy, to direct innovation 
towards the development of new drugs for rare diseases (Yin 2008).  Manufacturers that 
develop drugs for rare diseases receive extended market exclusivity, and other monetary 
incentives to encourage the development of drugs for unmet medical needs.  Regulators in 
healthcare markets may also impose policies that direct the rate of innovation of certain 
drugs.  The FDA’s accelerated approval program is one example of a policy that expedites 
the production of drugs that treat diseases with an unmet medical need (Fleming 2005).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Information Exchange in Healthcare Markets 
Information from pharmaceutical suppliers must pass through several regulators (red boxes) before 
healthcare consumers may receive the drug.  
Source: Author’s illustration, adapted from published reviews of healthcare markets (Ess et al 2003), 
(Drummond et al 1997).   
 
Governmental regulators, such as the FDA, must balance the need for safe and 
effective therapies with the need to promote pharmaceutical innovation (Philipson et al 
Healthcare 
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2008). Over the past few decades, it has become increasingly expensive to innovate in the 
pharmaceutical industry.  In the 1960s, the FDA received criticism for their approval of a 
sleeping pill that contained thalidomide, a chemical later found to cause extreme birth 
defects.  The disaster affected over 8000 infants in North America.  In response to this 
tragedy, the FDA’s approval process underwent a series of reforms.  Experts now estimate 
that post-thalidomide clinical trials cost drug manufacturers approximately ten times more 
than they did before the reforms (Reviewed in Connors 1996).  The high cost of 
conducting clinical trials is a suggested cause for the high prices of anticancer drugs.   
Some Economists question whether the FDA’s emphasis on safety is a social loss, 
since there is a great level of social benefits that result from the production of new drugs 
(Philipson et al 2008).  Aspinall and Hamermesh (2007) note that healthcare regulators 
will face critical operational changes as new medicines of the future make their way into 
healthcare markets (Aspinall and Hamermesh 2007).   
 
1.4 Healthcare Systems and Expensive New Therapeutics 
 
 
The high prices of new anticancer drugs imposes significant strains on many healthcare 
budgets (Rawlins 2007). The problem of rising pharmaceutical expenditures is a global 
concern.   Almost every developed country has experienced a sharp rise in drug spending 
in recent years (OECD 2005).  In Canada, the amount spent on new anticancer drugs has 
steadily increased--at a rate of 20% per year over the past ten years (Brodsky et al 2004). 
The rate of drug spending is well above Canada’s rate of inflation and growth in GDP 
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during this time (Government of Canada 2008).  Efforts to control pharmaceutical 
expenditures have been largely unsuccessful, across the globe (Ess et al 2003). 
While many factors contribute to the problem of pharmaceutical expenditures, high 
drug prices are one of the main problems that healthcare authorities hold accountable for 
the strain on healthcare budgets.  For example, some healthcare authorities have chosen 
not to adopt Genentech’s new anticancer drug, Avastin® (trade name, Bevacizumab) 
because of concerns about its high price (Berenson 2006).  For many healthcare 
authorities, the clinical benefits offered by the drug do not appear to be worth the amount 
that Genentech charges for the drug (Unspecified Author #1 2006; McManus 2007).  
In addition to concerns over healthcare budgets, governments are also concerned 
about the threat that expensive new drugs impose on social equity.  The selective 
reimbursement of Avastin® by some healthcare payers is a good example of the equity 
concerns at hand. In Canada, six out of ten provinces have decided against the public 
reimbursement of Avastin®. However, the remaining four provinces will publicly 
reimburse the drug in their health programs (CBC 2007; CBC 2008(a); CBC 2008(b)).  As 
a result, cancer patients in one province might not receive the same standard of care that is 
available in another province. In the US, even the “patient-pays” fraction of Avastin®’s 
co-payments are expensive for many cancer sufferers (Berenson 2006).  This effectively 
means that some people cannot afford to extend their lives.  In such cases, physicians may 
be inclined to withhold information about expensive treatments from their patients.   
Indeed, some physicians admit to having withheld information about new treatments when 
they felt that their patients could not afford the upfront cost of the drug (Thomson et al 
2006). 
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The strain that expensive new drugs place on healthcare systems is likely to 
increase as populations in developed countries age.   It is anticipated that the population 
demographics for developed countries will shift towards more elderly persons and persons 
with health needs that require drug therapy (OECD 1994).  Therefore, mechanisms to 
value and regulate pharmaceutical expenditures are becoming increasingly important in 
many healthcare landscapes (Ess et al 2003). 
 
1.5 Valuing the Health Benefits of New Drugs 
 
 
 
Drug manufacturers must establish the value of their new drugs in order to sell them 
within healthcare markets. Drug manufacturers may utilize a number of different 
evaluation tools to demonstrate the value of new anticancer drugs. The ideal way to 
ascertain value of these new drugs is to demonstrate their cost-effectiveness through a 
cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) (Murray et al 2000; Drummond 2004).  
Before drug manufacturers prove that new drugs are cost-effective, they must 
prove the clinical value of the new drug. The following discussion concerns the regulation 
of drugs before they enter healthcare markets. The discussion refers to the diffusion of 
highly priced anticancer drugs into the Canadian healthcare system, specifically. 
Regulatory agencies use clinical data to ascertain the clinical benefit of new drugs. 
In the Canadian system, Health Canada uses clinical data to ensure that new drugs are 
effective before they enter the Canadian market (HC 2008). Similarly, the Food and Drugs 
Administration (FDA) regulates the release of drugs in the US, and the European 
Medicines Agency (EMEA) regulates European drug approvals.  
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Review of the cost-effectiveness of new drugs may occur at different levels of 
authority in different countries.  Some countries require manufacturers to provide 
pharmacoeconomic evaluations for the drugs that they sell2.  Other nations have 
committees or review panels that investigate the cost-effectiveness of new drugs coming 
to market.    
Canada has a quasi-judicial organization, called the Patented Medicines Pricing 
Review Board (PMPRB), which attempts to ensure that the price of new drugs is not 
“excessive”.  After Health Canada approves new drugs for use, the PMPB makes 
recommendations to the government about the cost-effectiveness of new anticancer drugs.  
After this regulatory screen, provincial governments are then responsible for deciding 
whether or not to adapt new drugs onto their provincial formularies.  Other factors, such as 
budget constraints, political pressure and pressure from patient advocacy groups may also 
contribute to adoption decisions (Kapiriri et al 2007). 
 
1.5.1 Economic Evaluation 
 
Evaluation of new drugs through a CEA is a classic approach to economic evaluation 
(Drummond 1997). Healthcare decision-makers may also use a more extensive form of 
analysis known as cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to inform resource allocation decisions. 
This form of analysis estimates a monetary value for all of the resources consumed by the 
adoption of a new drug and for all benefits that it may provide (Boardman et al 2006). The 
                                                
2 The International Society for Pharmacoeconomic Outcomes Research is good resource 
which summarizes international guidelines for healthcare evaluations: 
http://www.ispor.org/PEguidelines/index.asp. 
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use of CBA is sometimes impractical for healthcare decisions, since some healthcare 
resources are not readily convertible into monetary values (Ackerman and Heinzerling 
2002).  For example, the amount of pain that patients experience is not easily quantifiable 
into dollar terms. 
To work around this problem, health programs use measures of utility rather than 
dollar values to determine the health benefits of new drugs. The utility refers to a set of the 
preferences that individuals have for a particular state of health. This enables health 
outcomes to follow the established protocols of CBA (Drummond et al 1997). 
Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) express utility in terms of time.  QALYs are 
calculated by multiplying the utility measure by a relevant number of life years gained 
(Elliot and Payne 2005). QALYs account for benefits in both the quality and length of life 
provided by new healthcare interventions (i.e. anticancer drugs). Utility measures in 
economic evaluations allow for comparison of health gains from different programs for 
different diseases.  Thus, cost utility analyses often inform decisions towards the most 
efficient allocation of healthcare funds (or resources).  
 
1.5.2 Prioritization of Healthcare Resources 
 
Decision-makers in healthcare programs must prioritize new therapeutics in order to 
efficiently ration scarce healthcare resources (Millar 2002).  Many members of the 
medical community fear that healthcare budgets are in danger of eventual depletion.  One 
concern for healthcare capacity constraints originates from Hiatt’s argument that there are 
diminishing healthcare resources (Hiatt 1975).   If each member of society consumes these 
resources out of their own rational self-interest, then society (in aggregate) will have fewer 
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resources available. Hiatt’s argument has generated widespread concern over healthcare 
rationing and prioritization.  Authorities in many healthcare systems respond to the 
perceived threat of insustainability by prioritization and price regulation. 
Experts in economics fear that the move to protect healthcare funds by 
prioritization may have adverse effects on the introduction of future breakthrough drugs 
(Vernon 2003b).  Intuitively, pharmaceutical manufacturers oppose any program 
(especially price regulations) that reduces their ability to earn profits.  Thus, there are 
conflicting interests between those interests of healthcare authorities and the interest of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers.  
 Many fear that high drug prices place a substantial strain on healthcare resources.  
Pharmaceutical manufacturers fear that if drug prices are too low, they will not be able to 
afford the high cost of innovating and the development of new drugs.  These conflicting 
interests do not appear to complement today’s healthcare operations or pharmaceutical 
business models.  If the trend for high pricing continues, changes to these systems will be 
required.  These changes may require larger social investments in pharmaceutical 
innovation (Murphy and Topel 2008).  In the next chapter, we look back in time to explore 
the amount of social benefits received from the innovation of new anticancer drugs 
throughout history. 
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2 The History of Anticancer Drugs  
 
 
Since high drug prices fuel innovation, it is worthwhile to look at how innovation has 
brought forward new anticancer drugs throughout history.  This section discusses the 
development of anticancer drugs over the past century.  There have been three main eras 
of innovation: 1) the era of early cytotoxic drugs, 2) the era of therapeutics and 3) the 
current era of the targeted therapies.  In the next decade or so, we will enter the next era of 
personalized medicines. 
Cancer did not become a significant social concern up until the 20th century. The 
lack of awareness of cancer may be a reflection of the average life expectancy at the time.  
Around 1900, persons living in developed countries were expected to live less than 50 
years (WHO 2007). The medical gains made during the mid-1900s greatly increased life 
spans and enabled the detection of cancer in its early stages.  Since then, scientists, 
clinicians and governments have made significant gains in the fight against cancer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Timeline of Innovative Progress in Cancer Therapy 
Source:  Author’s illustration and knowledge of anticancer drugs 
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2.1 Early Cytotoxics: Anticancer Drugs of the 1950s and 1960s 
 
 
The therapeutic administration of nitrogen mustards was the first major breakthrough in 
cancer chemotherapy (Goodman et al 1946).   Goodman et al (1946) used rudimentary 
clinical trials to show that these (otherwise toxic) compounds could reduce the size of 
tumor masses. The use of cytotoxic agents also established that cancer cells were highly 
sensitive to the toxic agents.  This finding led the way to several other new anticancer drugs. 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, other toxic agents were developed.  These agents 
could shrink different types of tumors with differing degrees of success.  During this time, 
society’s awareness of cancer also increased.  For example, in 1955 the National Cancer 
Chemotherapy Service Center became the first organization specifically devoted to cancer.  
Other establishments, such as the Montgomery Wall Research Park, Howard Hughes 
Medical Centre, the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Centre, soon followed (Triolo 1961).   
During this time, the pharmaceutical industry went through similar organizational 
changes.   Research groups at major pharmaceutical manufacturing companies formed 
cancer-specific teams (Bud 1978).   The Natural Products Division at Eli Lilly Company 
was a notable team formed during this period.  The scientists in the Natural Products 
Division were the first to isolate a class of cytotoxic drugs from periwinkle flowers 
(Pearce and Millar 2005).   Many chemotherapy regimens today still use this highly 
effective class of drugs.  The combination of scientists with clinicians formed the 
foundation for the next era of innovations in medical practices: the therapeutic age. 
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2.1.1 The Therapeutic Age: Progress against Cancer in the 1970s and 
1980s 
 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, innovations arising from medical practice rather than 
from pharmaceutical chemistry fueled the fight against cancer. The combination of 
different anticancer methods resulted in increased survival times (Diamandopoulus 1996).  
These combinations included the use of surgical, chemotherapeutic and/or radiological 
techniques that fought cancer (Kardinal and Yarbro 1979).  
During this era, childhood acute lymphoid leukemia, Hodgkin’s disease, testicular 
cancers and choliocarcinomas all became curable diseases (FHCRC 2008). The ability to 
detect the disease early on also contributed to increased chances for surviving cancer in 
the 1980s (Strax 1988).  When detected early, breast and skin cancers also became curable 
diseases. In 1980, the overall probability for surviving five years with any type of cancer 
in the US was about 50% (Ries et al 2006c). That number increased to 9% in the 
following decade. 
By the end of the 1970s, it was common to administer one or two cytotoxic drugs 
in combination with anti-inflammatory or antinauseal drugs.  The addition of these drugs 
to chemotherapy regimens increased the quality of life for cancer patients by offering 
relief from the discomforting side effects of chemotherapy.  The combination of several 
different anticancer drugs in a regimen also increased the effectiveness of the primary 
anticancer drug (Frei 1985). 
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2.1.2 Targeted Therapeutics 
 
 
Scientific advancements made in the 1980s and early 1990s led to the next era of targeted 
therapeutics.  Targeted therapeutics are technically superior to the anticancer drugs of 
previous eras.   These new drugs are technically superior because they act specifically on 
one biochemical pathway in diseased cells.  The ability to specifically target diseased cells 
with an anticancer drug prevents unintended damage to healthy cells.   
Targeted anticancer drugs have also generated substantial revenues for the 
pharmaceutical industry.  One example is the anticancer drug, Gleevac®, introduced in 
2001 by Novartis. Gleevac®, works specifically on chronic myelogenous leukemias, and 
leaves healthy cells unharmed.  Gleevac® generated more than three billion dollars in 
sales for Novartis in 2007 alone (Novartis 2008).  
The targeted drug, Taxol® (for breast and ovarian cancers) was the first anticancer 
drug to cause extensive concern over its high price (Sheldon 1997; Evans et al 2002).  
Critics initially argued that increasing R&D expenditures were the cause for the high 
prices of targeted drugs by pharmaceutical manufacturers (DiMasi et al 1992; Grabowski 
and Vernon 1994). The high-price trend has continued through the 1990s and, indeed, into 
the second millennium.   Now, nearly every new anticancer drug reaches market at a high 
price (Grabowski et al 2002).  As we enter the era of personalized medicine, experts 
anticipate the trend to high pricing will continue (Dreyer 2006).  
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2.1.3 The Forthcoming Era of Personalized Medicines 
 
 
Healthcare landscapes will change as we enter the era of personalized medicine. The 
greatest changes are expected to affect the development, marketing and uptake of future 
drugs into healthcare systems (Aspinall and Hamermesh 2007).  The business models used 
by pharmaceutical manufacturers today will also need to change.  This change is needed 
because future therapies will treat small sub-classes of disease instead of the large, 
generalized diseases classes of today (Unspecified Author #2 2007).  
Cancer therapies of the future will offer sophisticated improvements that originate 
from recent accomplishments in the field of genomics (Dunham et al 1999; Venter et al 
2001).  Genome-based medicines will match the pathology of a specific disease with 
greater precision. Narrowly-focused drugs against particular disease subclasses will 
replace the broad-spectrum blockbuster drugs that are common today (Dreyer 2006).  
Diagnostic tests will be necessary to confirm that the suspected molecular target is 
available. Without a doubt, these advancements will come at a very high price. 
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3 Clinical Benefits of Drugs against Breast Cancer 
 
 
The following two chapters are an analysis of the clinical benefits of new anticancer drugs in 
recent history.  These clinical benefits are then related to the drug prices in order to gain an 
understanding of how the price-benefit ratio has increased over time in Chapter Four.  This 
chapter specifically focuses on the increases in clinical benefits of breast cancer drugs over 
time. 
 Several effective treatments against breast cancer have come to market over the past 
decade.  Herceptin® (Trastuzumab) is one of the most advanced breast cancer drugs to be 
developed.  Herceptin® is an effective targeted therapeutic that attacks a specific subclass of 
breast cancer.  The type of tumors that Herceptin® works on are known as the “HER2 
positive” subclass of breast tumors. Until the advent of Herceptin®, patients with HER2 
positive tumors had a poor prognosis for survival. Now, over 400, 000 women worldwide 
have received the drug since its initial approval in 1998 (Genentech 2008a). Herceptin® has 
allowed these breast cancer patient either to be cured or at least live longer before disease 
progression. 
The known number of breast cancer subclasses has increased over time (see 
Appendix I).  Clinicians today are now able to diagnose different disease subclasses with 
greater precision than in the past.  More subclasses will emerge as our understanding of 
the mechanisms of disease progression further improves. The continued discovery of 
small differences between tumor subtypes will also bring forth new therapeutic targets for 
future drugs.  
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3.1 Assessing the Benefits of New Anticancer Drugs with 
Clinical Trial Endpoints 
 
 
Demonstration of efficacy in a clinical trial is usually the first indication that a new drug 
will be of some benefit to society.  Several other factors, however, may also influence the 
FDA’s decision towards the approval of new drugs.  These include the severity of disease 
at hand and the availability of other effective medicines (Pazdur 2008). 
The primary and secondary endpoints of a clinical trial are the main outcomes that 
indicate a drug’s clinical efficacy.  The FDA publicizes all clinical outcomes that support 
their approval decisions on the Internet (FDA 2008d).  Currently, complete electronic 
records are available on the FDA’s website for most drugs approved after 1984.  This 
FDA-publicized information has been the main source of clinical outcomes used in this 
report.  
A comprehensive list of all FDA-approved breast and colorectal cancer drugs can 
be found in Appendix I and II, respectively.  Robust records of approval decisions did not 
become available on the FDA website until the mid-1980s.  It is for this reason that the 
analyses in the upcoming sections are limited to those drugs approved over the past 
decade.  
In 1992, the FDA introduced a process known as “accelerated approvals” for new 
drugs that could treat serious or life-threatening diseases (Fleming 2005).  The move to 
expedite the approval process led to the need for faster indicators of clinical benefits. 
Because of the need for faster indication of clinical benefits, the use of surrogate endpoints 
arose for rapid assessment of clinical trial outcomes.   
Surrogate endpoints are early indicators of the ability of a drug to improve overall 
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survival (OS, the “gold standard” for cancer outcomes).  Time to progression (TTP) and 
overall response rates (ORR) are two surrogate endpoints that are used to estimate the 
effectiveness of anticancer drugs (Pazdur 2008).  Surrogate endpoints may also assess the 
benefit of treatments against diseases that progress slowly.  All clinical trials submitted to 
the FDA use surrogate indicators to describe the clinical benefits of new breast cancer 
treatments.  
 
3.2 Drugs Approved for the Treatment of Metastatic Breast 
Cancer 
 
Metastatic breast cancer is an advanced stage of disease progression.  At this point, the 
diseased tissue has spread from the breast area and axillary lymph nodes under the arm to 
other organs (Cotterill 2000).  When breast cancer has reached the metastatic stage of 
progression, surgical procedures to remove the diseased tissues are often ineffective.  
Drugs developed against metastatic breast cancer aim to slow the progression of the 
disease, since a cure is not likely (Moore and Cobleigh 2007).  The FDA usually uses the 
endpoint, time to progression (TTP) to measure the clinical efficacy of new drugs against 
metastatic breast cancer.  
 
3.2.1 First-Line Treatments 
 
 
“First-line treatments” are drugs used as the initial treatment of cancer. Table 1 lists some 
of the first-line treatments that have recently become available for metastatic breast 
cancer.  The ability of new drugs to slow the disease has steadily increased over time. 
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Longer times to disease progression (TTP) indicate that a new drug is more effective at 
slowing disease progression.  In 1998, the new drug, Herceptin® was shown to halt 
disease progression for 6.5 months.  The expected TTP for first-line metastatic breast 
cancers has steadily increased over time.  Currently, in 2008, Avastin® has been shown to 
offer 11.5 months before signs of disease progression resume (FDA 2008).  This is 
equivalent to an expected two-year increase in overall survival for those patients who 
receive Avastin®. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  22 
 
Table 1. Drugs Approved as First-Line Treatments of Metastatic Breast Cancer 
Drug Approval 
date 
Trial 
Reference  
Trial Comparators Primary 
endpoint 
Outcome  
(Median 
months)* 
Secondary 
endpoint(s) 
Secondary 
outcome(s) 
Nolvadex®, 
tamoxifen  
04/01/93 (FDA 1993) Nolvadex® 
(Single arm) 
ORR 50% N/A N/A 
Herceptin®   + 
Paclitaxel 
6.7 
95% CI (5.2-9.9) 
p<0.000 1 
38% 
(28-48) 
p<0.001 
Herceptin®, 
trastuzumab  
09/25/98 
 
(FDA 
1998) 
Paclitaxel 
TTP 
 
2.5  
(2.0-2.3) 
p<0.000 1 
ORR 
15% 
(8-22) 
p<0.001 
Arimidex® 8.5 
(HR=1.01
† †
, lower 
95% CI=0.87) 
32.9% 
(HR=-1.01% 
lower 95% CI=-
0.77%) 
Arimidex®, 
anastrazole 
09/01/00 (FDA 
2000b) 
tamoxifen 
TTP 
8.3 
ORR 
32.6% 
Femara® 9.4 
(HR=0.70, 95%CI 0.6-
0.82) 
p=0.000 1 
30% 
(Odds ratio=1.71 
(1.26-2.32) 
p=0.000 6 
Femara®, 
letrozole 
01/09/01 
 
(FDA 
2001b) 
tamoxifen 
TTP 
6.0 
ORR 
20% 
Avastin® + 
Paclitaxel 
11.3  
(10.5-13.3) 
p<0.000 1 
 26.5 
(23.7-29.2) 
p 0.14 
Avastin®, 
bevicizumab 
02/22/08 
 
(FDA 
2008) 
Paclitaxel 
 
PFS** 
 
5.8 
(5.4-8.2) 
p<0.000 1 
 OS 
 
  24.8 
(21.4-27.4) 
p 0.14 
 
*when available, 95% CI is indicated in brackets below outcomes 
** Progression free survival (PFS) is comparable to TTP.  PFS includes data from patients who have passed away before the disease 
progresses (Pazdur 2008). TTP measures do not include patients who have died. 
† 95 % CI=95% confidence interval, the certainty that 95% of all data points fall within the specified limits (lower limit-higher limit) 
‡ HR=Hazard ratio, the relative risk that a treatment offers a greater benefit over a comparative treatment.  Hazard ratios less than 
one indicated that there is improvement over the comparator. 
Source: Author’s retrieval, comprehension and simplification of FDA web-published data.  This summary (and 
all forthcoming summaries of FDA approvals in this project) was generated by the author, using the main 
clinical trial outcome that informed the FDAs approval decision. The trial reference is cited in the “Reference” 
column. 
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3.2.2 Second-Line Treatments 
 
Patients may receive second-line treatments after a prior treatment has failed.  The chances 
of survival are much lower for surviving breast cancer patients that are treated with 
second-line drugs, after the failure of first-line treatments.  Second-line therapies seek to 
improve a patient’s quality of life and delay the onset of tumor progression.  The main 
clinical outcome used to evaluate second-line drugs is the Overall Response Rate (ORR).  
ORR measures the percentage of patients who experience a reduction in tumor size for a 
given amount of time (Pazdur 2008). TTP measures are usually the secondary (or 
supporting) endpoints in most second-line treatments.  
 Table 2 lists the drugs approved for the second-line treatment of metastatic breast 
cancer, since 1994.  In 1994, 26% of all patients receiving Taxol® responded to it. While 
receiving Taxol®, the average patient could expect 3.5-months of survival without tumor 
progression. Ten years later, in 2004, the drug Gemzar® almost doubled the percentage of 
patients that responded to 43%, and delivered 5.2 months of lifetime before the disease 
progressed. 
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Table 2. Drugs Approved as Second-Line Treatments of Metastatic Breast Cancer 
Drug Approval 
date 
Reference Comparators Primary 
endpoint 
Outcome Secondary 
Endpoint(s) 
Outcome 
Taxol®, 
paclitaxel 
04/13/94 (FDA 1994) Taxol®  
(single arm) 
ORR 26% 
(22-30%) 
i) TTP 
ii) Survival 
i) 3.5 
(range 0.03-17.1) 
ii) 11.7 
(range 0-18.9 
Taxotere®, 
docetaxel 
05/14/96 
 
(FDA 
1998c) 
Taxotere® 
 
 
ORR 41%* i) TTP 
ii) O/S 
iii) 1 yr 
survival 
i) 4 (0.2-17.5) 
ii) 10 (0.2-24.6) 
iii) 43% 
Arimidex®  10.3% 92-512d Arimidex®, 
anastrazole 
12/27/95 (FDA 1995) 
Megestrol acetate 
ORR 
7.9% 
Duration of 
Response 111-427d 
Fareston® a) 21.3% 
b) 20.4% 
c) 31.3% 
i)  a) 5.6           ii) a) 33.6 
    b) 4.9                b) 25.4 
    c) 7.3                 c) 33.0 
Tamoxifen a) 19.1% 
b) 20.8% 
c) 37.3% 
i)  a) 5.8           ii) a) 34 
    b) 5.0                b) 23.4 
    c) 10.2              c) 38.7 
Femara® 23.6% i) 5.67 
ii) 24.3 
Fareston®, 
toremifene 
05/29/97 (FDA 1997; 
GTx 2008) 
Megesterol acetate 
RR** 
16.3% 
i) TTP 
ii) Survival 
i) 5.6 
ii) 22.0 
Xeloda®, 
capectibine 
04/30/98 (FDA 
1998b) 
Xeloda®  
(single arm) 
ORR 18.5% 
(12.4%-26.1%) 
TTP 3.13 
(2.8-3.9) 
Herceptin® , 
trastuzumab  
09/25/98 
 
(FDA 1998) Herceptin® 
(single arm) 
ORR 
 
14% i) TTP 
ii) Survival 
i) 3.1 
95%CI (2.3-3.4) 
ii) 12.8 
95%CI (9.9-on going) 
Aromasin® 15%  4.73 Aromasin®, 
exemestane 
10/21/99 (FDA 1999c) 
Megesterol acetate 
ORR 
12.4% 
TTP****** 
3.87 
Faslodex® i) 20.3% 
ii) 17% 
i) 5.53 
ii) 5.5 
Faslodex®, 
fulvestrant 
05/25/02 (FDA 2002c) 
Anastrazole 
ORR 
i) European 
trial 
ii) US trial i) 14.9% 
ii) 17% 
TTP 
i) 5.2 
ii) 3.43 
Gemzar® +  
Paclitaxel 
40.8% 
95%CI  
(34.9-46.7) 
5.2 
95%CI (4.2-5.6) 
Gemzar®, 
gemcitabine 
05/19/04 (FDA 2004f) 
Paclitaxel 
ORR 
22.1% 
95%CI  
(17.1-27.2) 
TTP 
2.9  
95%CI (2.6-3.7) 
Abraxane®  21.5% 
95%CI  
(16.2-26.7) 
15.5%  
95%CI (9.26%-21.75%) 
Abraxane®, 
paclitaxel 
protein-
bound 
particles 
01/07/05 (FDA 2005b) 
Paclitaxel 
TLRR 
( randomized 
metastatic b.c.) 
11.1% 
95%CI  
(6.9-15.1) 
TLRR 
(failed 
combination 
chemo or relapse 
within 6 months) 
8.4% 
95%CI (3.85%-12.94%) 
T y kerb®  
+ capectibine 
6.3 23.7%  
95%CI (18.0-30.3) 
Tykerb®, 
Lapatinib, 
ditosylate 
03/13/07 (FDA 2007c) 
capectabine 
TTP 
4.34 
ORR 
13.9%  
95%CI (9.5-19.5) 
†when available, 95% CI is indicated in brackets below outcomes 
*This is for the intent to treat population. For the patients deemed evaluable (not lost to death or inability to follow-up), the overall 
response rate was 43% 
**three trials (a, b, and c) were analyzed  
Source: Author’s representation, simplification and retrieval of FDA web-published data as cited in the second 
column  
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3.2.3 Improvement for Metastatic Breast Cancer: Summary of Clinical 
Benefits 
 
Figure 4 shows the relationship between TTP measures (as listed in Tables 1 and 2) and the 
drug’s approval date. New drugs against metastatic breast cancer have resulted in an 
overall increase in the median months to disease progression, over time.  This improving 
trend for increasing clinical benefits is perhaps not surprising, since the FDA expects new 
drugs to offer improvements over pre-existing treatments. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Clinical Benefits of First and Second-Line Treatments Approved for use 
against Metastatic Breast Cancer 
Source: Author’s representation and retrieval of clinical efficacy outcomes from FDA approval records 
Error bars represent the 95% CI limits when they were included in the efficacy report.  Not all FDA-
published records include error estimates. 
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3.3 Advancement in Adjuvant Breast Cancer Treatments 
 
Drugs used in the adjuvant setting reduce the chance that a tumor will return after some 
form of initial therapy.  The type of initial therapy received before the administration of 
adjuvant treatments can vary. The selection of first-line treatment depends on the disease 
subclass and stage of progression.  In many cases, adjuvant treatments follow the surgical 
removal of the primary tumor mass.  Adjuvant therapy may also complement an initial 
round of chemotherapy.  
The FDA uses the endpoint, “disease free survival (DFS)” to measure the clinical 
benefit of drugs that are used in the adjuvant setting. Drugs that increase DFS have a low 
hazard ratio, as compared to other (pre-existing) treatments (Spruance et al 2004). Table 3 
summarizes the drugs approved for use as adjuvant treatments against breast cancer. The 
first adjuvant treatment that was approved and recorded on the FDA’s website was 
Tamoxifen®, in 1986.  The drug replaced ovarian ablation (either removal or irradiation 
of the ovaries) as an adjuvant treatment following surgery (FDA 1986).   
Many breast cancer patients may now live their entire lives without further signs of 
the disease because of these new adjuvant treatments (Dinh et al 2007).  Modern 
treatments also aim to enhance the quality of life for patients that receive adjuvant 
chemotherapy.  The concern over quality of life is particularly important, since adjuvant 
therapies often last for five years.  Some of these treatments are as simple as once-daily 
hormone pills. The use of Herceptin®-containing regimens has produced the greatest 
reduction in disease recurrence of all adjuvant treatments. 
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Table 3. Drugs Approved for Adjuvant Breast Cancer Therapy 
Drug Specific  
Indication 
Approval 
date 
Reference Comparators Primary 
end-
point 
Outcome 
 
Other 
end-
point 
Outcome 
No lvadex®, tamoxifen   Nolvadex®, 
tamoxifen 
After surgery 12/03/86 (FDA 1986) 
Ovarian ablation 
n/a 
 
 
 
No lvadex®, tamoxifen Equal 
efficacy 
 Nolvadex®, 
tamoxifen 
Metastatic 03/16/89 (FDA 1989) 
Ovarian Ablation 
DFS 
 
 
 
No lvadex®, tamoxifen  Nolvadex®, 
tamoxifen 
Node 
positive b.c. 
after surgery 
06/21/90 (FDA 1990) 
Placebo 
DFS Modest 
improvement 
 
 
CP, E l l enc e®,   
Fluorouracil 
62% 
(HR=0.758, 
p=0.013) 
77% 
(HR=0.714, 
p=0.043) 
Ellence®, 
epirubicin 
Axillary 
involvement 
after 
resection 
09/15/99 (FDA 1999) 
CP, Methotrexate, 
Fluorouracil 
RFS* 
53% 
OS 
70% 
CP, Dox, Taxo l® Taxol®, 
paclitaxel 
Node 
positive after 
doxorubicin 
10/25/99 (FDA 1999b) 
CP, Dox 
DFS HR=0.78 
(0.67-0.91) 
OS 
 
HR=0.74 
(0.60-0.92) 
Ar imidex®  (1mg/d) Arimidex®, 
anastrazole 
Hormone 
receptor, 
early b. c. 
09/05/02 (FDA 2002b) 
Tamoxifen 
RFS 
 
HR=0.83 
(0.71-0.96) 
p=0.0144 
  
Adr iamyc in® containing 
regimens†  
Adriamycin®, 
Doxorubicin 
(Dox) 
After 
resection of 
node 
positive 
primary bc 
05/08/03 (FDA 2003) 
Methotrexate, 
Cyclophosphamide, 
Fluorouracil 
DFS HR=0.91 
(0.82-1.01) 
OS HR=0.91 
(0.81-1.03) 
Taxo t ere®,  Dox, CP Taxotere®, 
docetaxel 
Operable, 
node 
positive b.c. 
08/18/04 
 
(FDA 
2004e) 
Fluorouracil, Dox, CP 
DFS HR=0.74 
(0.60-0.92) 
OS HR=0.69 
(0.53-0.90) 
Femara® Femara®, 
letrozole 
Early b.c. 
after 5 years 
of tamoxifen 
10/29/04 (FDA 2004d) 
Placebo 
DFS HR=0.62 
(0.49-0.78) 
p=0.00003 
  
Aromas in® Aromasin®, 
exemestane 
After 2-3 
years of 
tamoxifen 
10/05/05 (FDA 2005) 
Tamoxifen 
DFS HR=0.69 
(0.58-0.82) 
p=0.00003 
OS HR=0.86 
(0.67-1.10) 
p=0.2296 
CP, 
Ep irub i c in®,   
Fluorouracil 
62% 
HR=0.76 
(0.6-0.96 
77% 
HR=0.71 
(0.52-0.98) 
Epirubicin®, 
epirubicin 
After the 
treatment of 
axillary-
node 
positive 
breast cancer 
09/15/06 (FDA 2006b) 
CP, Methotrexate, 
Fluorouracil 
RFS 
 
53% 
OS 
 
70% 
Dox, CP then H erc ep t in® 
+ either paclitaxel or 
docetaxel 
Herceptin®, 
trastuzumab   
HER2+, 
node  
Positive 
Tumors 
11/16/06 
 
 
(FDA 
2006c) 
Dox, CP, then either 
paclitaxel or docetaxel 
DFS HR=0.48 
(0.39-0.59) 
p=<0.0001 
 
OS HR=0.67 
Not 
significant 
anthracycline therapy then 
H ercep t in® 
Herceptin®, 
trastuzumab 
HER2+, 
node 
positive or 
high risk 
node 
negative 
01/18/08 
 
 
(FDA 
2008c) 
anthracycline therapy 
DFS 
 
 
HR=0.54 
(0.44-0.67) 
p=<0.0001 
OS HR=0.75 
Not 
significant 
Dox, CP then Docetaxol + 
carboplatin + Her cep t in® 
HR=0.67 
(0.54-0.84) 
p=0.0006 
 
Dox, CP then Docetaxol + 
H ercep t in® 
HR=0.60 
(0.48-0.76) 
p=<0.0001 
 
Herceptin®, 
trastuzumab 
As part of 
carboplatin 
and 
docetaxol 
adjuvant 
regimens 
05/22/08 (Genentech 
2008c) 
Dox, CP then Docetaxol 
DFS 
 
 
 
†based on meta-analysis published by the Early Breast Cancer Trialists Collaborative Group in 1998 
*5 year relapse free survival and overall survival outcomes were measured 
Abbreviations used in Table 3: bc=breast cancer, OS=overall survival, DFS= disease free survival, RFS=relapse free survival, 
HR=hazard ratio, Dox=doxorubicin, CP=cyclophosphamide.  
Source: Author’s representation, comprehension and retrieval of web-published data as cited in “Reference” 
column  
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Figure 5 compares the hazard ratios of DFS for new drugs that have been used as 
adjuvant therapies over the past decade. One regimen of Herceptin® (approved in 2006) 
shows a very high level of improvement (as indicated by a low hazard ratio for DFS).  
Herceptin® offers substantial benefits in all four of its approved regimens.  
Disease sub-classification becomes important when comparing different adjuvant 
treatments.  Some breast cancer subclasses are more likely to return than are others.  
Similarly, the chance of disease recurrence is also a function of the patient’s age. Therefore, 
the comparison of treatments in the adjuvant setting is somewhat simplified in this project.  
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Figure 5.  Clinical Benefits of New Drugs Approved as Adjuvant Therapies for 
Breast Cancer 
Source: Author’s representation of clinical efficacy outcomes retrieved from various FDA approval records 
listed in Table 3. 
Herceptin® has proven clinical efficacy in four different adjuvant settings.  The drug was initially approved 
in 2006 as a treatment against the “node positive” subclass of breast tumors. In 2008a, Herceptin® also 
received approval as an adjuvant treatment for the sub-class of patients who are “at risk of axillary node 
involvement”. 2008b and c are adjuvant treatments that combine Herceptin® with doxorubicin (b) or 
oxaliplatin (c). 
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3.4 The Price of New Breast Cancer Treatments 
 
 
This section investigates the changes in the price of new breast cancer drugs that have 
recently come to market in British Columbia. The author used price information provided 
by the BC Cancer Agency to calculate individual drug prices. All drugs in the original 
FDA-approved regimen were considered when calculating total treatment price.  For 
example, if drug “A” was approved for use in combination with drug “B”, the sum of the 
prices for drugs A and B was added to generate an estimated total treatment cost. For 
simplicity, the total expected price of all the drugs in the approved regimen was calculated 
on a “per patient” basis. These calculations are shown in Table 43. The analysis is limited 
to those FDA-approved drugs that were also adopted into British Columbia’s healthcare 
system due to price availability.   The price of indirect and non-drug components were not 
included these calculations. 
The duration of time that the treatment occurred for was an important contribution 
to the calculation of drug prices.  In most cases, the drug’s recommended dosage gave a 
reasonable indication of the expected duration of time for which the average patient would 
consume the drug.  Metastatic treatments usually cease after visible signs of tumor 
progression become evident.  Thus, the median months before disease progression were 
used to calculate the expected duration of treatment in the metastatic setting (Table 5).    
 
 
 
                                                
3 Out of concerns for confidentiality between the BCCA and drug manufacturers, the 
actual prices for the drugs remain undisclosed in this project 
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Table 4. Calculation of Treatment Costs for Drugs against Metastatic Breast Cancer 
Drug Trial 
refere
nce 
Regimen Dosage multipl
ier* 
Dose 
** 
Doses 
/cycle 
Cycles
† 
Rema
ining 
doses 
Total 
mg 
dosed 
Price 
per 
mg‡ 
Cumulative 
Drug price 
(per patient) 
Total 
treatment 
cost 
Herceptin® 66 4 1 1  264 xxxx xxxx 
Herceptin® 66 2 1 29  3828 xxxx xxxx 
Herceptin®, 
trastuzumab 
 
FDA 
1998e 
 
paclitaxel 1.6 20 1 11  352 xxxx xxxx 
Xx   xx 
Arimidex®, 
anastrazole 
FDA 
2000c 
Arimidex® n/a 1 255   5508 xxxx xxxx Xxx   x 
Femara®, 
letrozole 
FDA 
2001c 
Femara® n/a 2.5 282   705 xxxx xxxx Xxx  x 
Avastin® 66 10 1 25  16500 xxxx xxxx Avastin®, 
bevacizumab 
 
FDA 
2008 
 paclitaxel 1.6 90 3 13  5616 xxxx xxxx 
Xx   xx 
 
Taxol®, 
paclitaxel 
FDA 
1994 
Taxol® 1.6 175 1 5  1400 xxxx xxxx Xx   xx 
Taxotere®, 
docetaxol 
FDA 
1996, 
FDA 
1998c  
Taxotere® 1.6 100 1 7  1120 xxxx xxxx Xx   xx 
Femara®, 
letrozole 
FDA 
1997b 
Femara®  2.5 170   425.25 xxxx xxxx Xx   xx 
Xeloda®, 
capectibine 
FDA 
1998g 
Xeloda® 1.6 251
0 
14 5 11 325296 xxxx xxxx 
 
Xx   xx 
Herceptin® 66 4 1 1  264 xxxx xxxx Herceptin®, 
trastuzumab 
FDA 
1998e Herceptin® 66 2 1 14  1848 xxxx xxxx 
Xx   xx 
Aromasin®, 
exemestane 
FDA 
1999d 
Aromasin® n/a 25 141.9   3547.5 xxxx xxxx 
 
Xx   xx 
Gemzar® 1.6 125
0 
2 9  36000 xxxx xxxx Xx   xx Gemzar®, 
gemcitabine 
  
FDA 
2004h 
paclitaxel 1.6 175 1 9  2520 xxxx xxxx Xx   xx 
*(average BSA (m2) or average weight (kg)), Average BSA of a female American = 1.6mg/m2 , average weight = 66 kg  
**FDA approved labels inform regimens and dosing schedules as referenced in column 2  
†Calculated from TTP outcomes (Table 5) 
‡Price is in Canadian dollars at approval date or closest quarter to approval date that the drug became available at the BC Cancer 
Agency 
Source: Author’s calculations and the “price per mg” of each drug (column 10) supplied by the BC Cancer Agency 
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Table 5. Calculation of Duration of Treatment with Metastatic Breast Cancer Drugs 
Drug Reference TTP 
(Median 
months) 
Days to 
progression 
Weeks to 
progression 
Weeks/
cycle 
Median 
cycles 
completed 
Remaini
ng doses 
 (mid-
cycle) 
Herceptin® FDA 1998e 6.7 201 28.71 6 5 4 
paclitaxel FDA 1998e 6.7 201 28.71 1 
30 
 
 
Arimidex® FDA 2000c 8.5 255   255  
Femara® FDA 2001c 9.4 282   282  
Avastin® FDA 2008 11.3 339 48.43 2 25  
Taxol® FDA 1994 3.5 105 15.00 3 5  
Taxotere® FDA 1996, FDA 1998c 4 120 17.14 7   
Farneston® GTx 2008 5.9 178 25.43  178  
Femara® FDA 1997b  5.7 171 24.43  171  
Xeloda® FDA 1998g 3.1 94 13.41 3 9 11 
Herceptin® FDA 1998e 3.1 93 13.29 1 15  
Aromasin® FDA 1999d 4.7 141.9 20.27  141.9  
Gemzar® FDA 2004h 5.2 156 22.2 3 9  
Source: Author’s calculations 
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The relative prices of treatments against metastatic breast cancer are shown in 
Figure 6. The two targeted drugs, Herceptin® and Avastin®, are the most expensive 
breast cancer drugs introduced during this time.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Prices for Metastatic Breast Cancer Treatments  
Source: Author’s calculations listed in Table 4 and 5 
 
A similar calculation was used to determine the price of treatments used in the 
adjuvant setting against breast cancer.  Table 6 shows the calculations for the prices of 
adjuvant breast cancer therapies.  Figure 7 then illustrates how the prices for adjuvant 
treatments have increased over time. 
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Table 6. Calculation of Treatment Costs for Adjuvant Therapy of Breast Cancer 
Drug Trial 
refere
nce 
Regimen Dosage multipl
ier* 
Dose 
** 
Doses 
/cycle 
Cycles
† 
Rema
ining 
doses 
Total 
mg 
dosed 
Price 
per 
mg‡ 
Cumulative 
Drug Price 
(per patient) 
Total 
treatment 
cost 
Cyclophosphamide 1.6 600 1 4  3840 xxxx xxxx 
Doxorubicin 1.6 60 1 4  384 xxxx xxxx 
Taxol®, 
paclitaxel 
  
  
FDA 
1999b 
 
Taxol® 1.6 175 1 4  1120 xxxx xxxx 
Xx   xx 
Arimidex®, 
anastrazole 
FDA 
2002d; 
FDA 
2004g) 
Arimidex®  1 1 1825  1825 xxxx xxxx Xxx   x 
Adriamycin® 1.6 60 1 4  384 Adriamycin®, 
doxorubicin 
  
FDA 
2003b Cyclophosphamide 1.6 600 1 4  3840 
xxxx xxxx Xxx  x 
Taxotere® 1.6 75 1 6  720 xxxx xxxx 
Adriamycin® 1.6 50 1 6  480 
Taxotere®, 
docetaxol 
  
  
FDA 
2004e 
 
Cyclophosphamide 1.6 500 1 6  4800 
xxxx xxxx 
Xx   xx 
 
Femara® FDA 
2004d 
Femara®  2.5 1 1825  4562.
5 
xxxx xxxx Xx   xx 
Aromasin®  25 1 1095  27375 Aromasin®, 
exemestane 
FDA 
2005  Tamoxifen®  25 1 730  18250 
xxxx xxxx Xx   xx 
Epirubicin® 1.6 100 1 6  960 
5-FU® 1.6 500 1 6  4800 
Ellence®, 
epirubicin 
  
  
FDA 
2006b 
 
Cyclophosphamide 1.6 500 1 6  4800 
xxxx xxxx Xx   xx 
Herceptin® 66 4 1 1  264 
Herceptin® 66 2 1 51  6732 
Adriamycin® 1.6 60 1 4  384 
Cyclophosphamide 1.6 600 1 4  3840 
Herceptin®, 
trastuzumab 
  
  
  
FDA 
2006c 
 
paclitaxel 1.6 80 1 12  1536 
xxxx xxxx 
 
Xx   xx 
Herceptin® 66 8 1 1  528 xxxx xxxx 
Herceptin® 66 6 1 17  6732 xxxx xxxx 
Adriamycin® 1.6 60 1 4  384 xxxx xxxx 
Herceptin®, 
trastuzumab 
  
  
  
FDA 
2008c 
FDA 
2008c 
Cyclophosphamide 1.6 600 1 4  3840 xxxx xxxx 
Xx   xx 
Herceptin® 66 4 1 1  264 xxxx xxxx 
Herceptin® 66 8 1 1  528 xxxx xxxx 
Herceptin® 66 2 1 11  1452 xxxx xxxx 
Herceptin® 66 6 1 13.33  5280 xxxx xxxx 
Adriamycin® 1.6 60 1 4  384 xxxx xxxx 
Cyclophosphamide 1.6 600 1 4  3840 xxxx xxxx 
Herceptin®, 
trastuzumab 
  
  
  
  
  
Genen
tech 
2008 
 
docetaxel 1.6 100 1 4  640 xxxx xxxx 
Xx   xx 
Herceptin® 66 4 1 1  264 xxxx xxxx Xx   xx 
Herceptin® 66 2 1 11  1452 xxxx xxxx 
Herceptin® 66 6 1 13  5280 xxxx xxxx 
Adriamycin® 1.6 60 1 4  384 xxxx xxxx 
Cyclophosphamide 1.6 600 1 4  3840 xxxx xxxx 
docetaxel 1.6 75 1 6  720 xxxx xxxx 
Herceptin®, 
trastuzumab 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Genen
tech 
2008 
 
carboplatin 1.6 600 1 6  5760 xxxx xxxx 
Xx   xx 
*(average BSA (m2) or average weight (kg)), Average BSA of a female American = 1.6mg/m2 , average weight = 66 kg  
**FDA approved labels inform regimens and dosing schedules as referenced in column 2  
† Adjuvant therapies specify the suggested length of treatment (usually 5 years) in the trial reference and approved product label 
‡Price at approval date or closest quarter to approval date that the drug became available at the BC Cancer Agency 
Source: Author’s calculations and the “price per mg” of each drug (column 10) supplied by the BC Cancer Agency 
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Figure 7.  Prices for Adjuvant Breast Cancer Treatments 
Source: Author’s calculations (Table 6) 
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4 Clinical Benefits of Drugs against Colorectal Cancer  
 
 
This chapter uses a similar framework as Chapter 3 to investigate the change in clinical 
benefits and prices of drugs recently developed against colorectal cancers.  In the United 
States, cancers of the gastrointestinal tract comprise the most common form of non-skin 
cancer (Parkin et al 2002). These cancers often go undiagnosed, since regular screening 
programs for this disease are uncommon in today’s medical practices (Redaelli et al 
2003).  The chances of survival are low for metastatic colorectal cancers (CRC) (Weitz et 
al  2005).  Because of the relatively fast rate of progression of CRC, overall survival (OS) 
outcomes are the primary endpoints of clinical trials.  Surrogate indicators (such as the 
time to progression (TTP) or disease free survival (DFS)) are the secondary endpoints for 
CRC trials.   
Relatively few drugs that are effective against CRC have been developed over 
time, despite the underlying need for new treatments against this disease.  For example, 
the drug 5-Flourouracil (5-FU) remained the most commonly-used drug against metastatic 
CRC for nearly twenty years (Meyerhardt and Mayer 2005).  Median overall survival 
remained low (ten months) between 1975 and 1995 (O'Connell 1989).  Over the past ten 
years, however, survival of up to 21 months has become possible with new anticancer 
drugs. Tables 7 and 8 list the FDA’s newly approved drugs against metastatic CRC. 
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Table 7.  First-Line Treatments of Metastatic Colorectal Cancer 
Drug Approv
al date 
Reference Comparators Overall survival 
(Median months) 
Camptosar® + 5-FU/LV 17.4 Camptosar®, 
irinotecan 
4/20/00 (FDA 2000) 
5-FU/LV 14.1 
Xeloda® 13.07* Xeloda® , 
capectibine 
4/30/01 (FDA 2001) 
5-FU/LV 13.03* 
Eloxatin® +5-FU/LV  
19.4 (17.9-21.0) 
Eloxatin® + Irinotecan 17.6 (15.8-19.6) 
Eloxatin®, 
oxaliplatin 
01/09/04 (FDA 2004c) 
5-FU/LV + Irinotecan 14.6 (12.4-16.7) 
Avastin®  + Intravenous 5-FU, leucovorin and 
irinotecan 
 
20.3  Avastin®, 
bevacizumab 
02/26/04 (FDA 2004) 
Intravenous 5-FU, leucovorin and irinotecan 15.6  
Erbitux® n/a† Erbitux®, 
cetuximab 
02/10/07 (FDA 2007b) 
Erbitux® + Irinotecan n/a† 
*Approval of Xeloda® was based on non-inferiority to 5-FU-LV using combined results of two different trials 
†Overall survival data is not available for Erbitux® therefore encouraging response rates formed the basis of this approval decision 
Source: Author’s retrieval, comprehension and simplification of FDA web-published data as cited in “Reference” column  
 
 
Table 8.  Second-Line Treatments of Metastatic Colorectal Cancer 
Drug Approval 
date 
Re fe rence Comparators Overall survival 
(Median months)   
Camptosar® + Best supportive 
care** 
 
9.2 
Camptosar®, 
irinotecan 
10/22/98 (FDA 1998d) 
Best supportive care** 6.5 
Eloxatin® +5-FU/LV (FOLFOX4) 11 Eloxatin®, 
oxaliplatin 
08/09/02 
 
 
(FDA 2002) 
5-FU/LV 8 
Erbitux® + best supportive care 6.14  Erbitux®, 
cetuximab 
02/12/04 (FDA 2004b) 
Best supportive care 4.57  
Avastin® + FOLFOX4* 13 Avastin®, 
bevacizumab 
06/20/06 (FDA 2006e) 
FOLFOX4* 10.8 
*FOLFOX4=5-FU/LV (5-Fluorouracil/leucovorin and oxaliplatin) 
** Best supportive care = this is the best supportive care that is available to patients.  This may include the administration of antibiotics, 
analgesics, transfusions, corticosteroids, psychotherapy, radiation and any other symptomatic therapy except the class of therapeutics 
under clinical investigation. 
Source: Author’s retrieval, comprehension and simplification of FDA web-published data as cited in “Reference” column  
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Like breast cancer treatments, CRC drugs have provided increasing clinical benefits 
over time.  Figure 8 shows the benefits of the six drugs against metastatic CRC that the 
FDA has approved over the past decade.  It demonstrates that the level of clinical benefits 
received has steadily increased over time. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Improvements in the Overall Survival of Metastatic Colorectal Cancer 
Source: Author’s representation of data in Tables 7 and 8  
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4.1 The Price of New Drugs against Colorectal Cancer 
 
New drugs against CRC work most effectively when used in combination with other 
drugs.  Almost every new FDA approval for CRC drugs includes the use of pre-existing 
drugs, such as 5-FU. The calculation of CRC treatment prices was by similar methods to 
the calculations for breast cancer treatments described in Section 3.4.  These calculations 
are listed in Table 9. The secondary endpoint of all CRC trials, TTP, was used to 
determine the expected duration of treatment for CRC patients receiving the drug (Table 
10). However, the addition of other drugs to the regimen makes a significant contribution 
to the total price of treatment, as summarized in Figure 9. 
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Table 9. Calculation of Treatment Costs for Drugs against Colorectal Cancer 
Drug Trial reference Regimen 
Dosage 
multiplier* 
Dose** Doses 
/cycle 
Cycles† Rema
ining 
doses 
Total 
mg 
dosed 
Price 
per 
mg‡ 
Cumulative 
Drug price 
(per patient) 
Total 
treatment  
cost 
Camptosar® 1.7 125 4 5 4 5100 xxxx xxxx 
LV 1.7 20    816 xxxx xxxx 
Camptosar®, 
irinotecan 
FDA 2000d 
Treatment 
regimen 1 
5-FU 1.7 500    20400 xxxx xxxx 
Xx   xx 
Camptosar® 1.7 180 3 5 3 5508 xxxx xxxx 
LV 1.7 200    6120 xxxx xxxx 
5-FU 1.7 400    12240 xxxx xxxx 
Camptosar®, 
irinotecan 
FDA 
2000d, 
Treatment 
regimen 2 
5-FU 1.7 600    18360 xxxx xxxx 
Xxx   x 
Xeloda®, 
capectibine 
FDA 2001 Xeloda® 1.7 2500 14 8  476000 xxxx xxxx Xxx  x 
Eloxatin® 1.7 85 1 19  2745.5 xxxx xxxx 
LV 1.7 200 2   12920 xxxx xxxx 
5-FU 1.7 400 2   25840 xxxx xxxx 
Eloxatin®, 
oxaliplatin 
FDA 2004i 
5-FU 1.7 600 2   38760 xxxx xxxx 
Xx   xx 
 
Avastin® 76.17 5 1 23 1 9140 xxxx xxxx 
LV 1.7 20 4 6 3 918 xxxx xxxx 
5-FU 1.7 500 4 6 3 22950 xxxx xxxx 
Avastin®, 
bevicizumab 
FDA 2004j 
Irinotecan 1.7 125 4 6 3 5737.5 xxxx xxxx 
Xx   xx 
 
Camptosar®, 
irinotecan 
FDA 
1998h, 
Regimen 1 
Camptosar® 1.7 125 4 3 1 2762.5 xxxx xxxx Xx   xx 
Camptosar®, 
irinotecan 
FDA 
1998h, 
Regimen 2 
Camptosar® 1.7 350 1 9  5355 xxxx xxxx Xx   xx 
Eloxatin® 1.7 85 1 10  1445 xxxx xxxx 
LV 1.7 200 2   6800 xxxx xxxx 
5-FU 1.7 400 2   13600 xxxx xxxx 
Eloxatin®, 
oxaliplatin 
FDA  2002f 
5-FU 1.7 600 2   20400 xxxx xxxx 
Xx   xx 
Avastin® 76.17 10 1 16  12187 xxxx xxxx 
LV 1.7 200 2   10880 xxxx xxxx 
5-FU 1.7 400 2   21760 xxxx xxxx 
Oxaliplatin 1.7 85 1   2312 xxxx xxxx 
Avastin®, 
bevicizumab 
FDA 2006e 
5-FU 1.7 600 2   32640 xxxx xxxx 
Xx   xx 
*using the average BSA (m2) or average weight (kg). Average BSA of a human American is 1.7mg/m2, average weight is 76 kg  
**FDA approved labels inform regimens and dosing schedules as referenced in column 2.  
†Calculated from TTP outcomes (Table 10) 
‡Price at approval date or closest quarter to approval date that the drug became available at the BC Cancer Agency 
Source: Author’s calculations and the “price per mg” of each drug (column 10) supplied by the BC Cancer Agency 
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Table 10. Calculation of Duration of Treatment with Drugs against Metastatic CRC 
Drug Reference TTP 
(median 
months) 
Days to 
progression 
Weeks to 
progression 
Weeks 
/cycle 
Median 
cycles 
completed 
Remaining 
doses  
(mid-cycle) 
Camptosar® FDA 2000 6.7 201 28.72 6 5 4 
Camptosar® FDA 2000 6.7 201 28.72 6 5 4 
Xeloda® FDA 2001 4.7 141 20.14 3 8 0 
Eloxatin® FDA 2004c 8.7 261 37.29 2 19 0 
Avastin® 10.6 318 45.43 2 23 1 
leucovorin 10.6 318 45.43 6 6 3 
irinotecan 10.6 318 45.43 6   
 5-FU 
FDA 2004 
10.6 318 45.43 6 6 3 
Camptosar® FDA 1998d*  5.7 171 24.43 6 10  
Eloxatin® FDA 2002 4.6 138 19.71 2 16  
Avastin® Giantonio, 2007 7.3 219 31.29 2 5 4 
*the endpoint used for this trial was specified as time to performance status deterioration rather than time to progression, TTP 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Figure 9.  Prices of New Drugs against Metastatic CRC 
Source: Author’s calculation of regimen dosing (Tables 9 and 10) 
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5 Price-Benefit Relationships of New Anticancer Drugs 
 
 
 
In this Chapter, we relate clinical benefits and drugs prices using the information 
presented in Chapters 3 and 4. The goal of his chapter is to see if the price of new 
anticancer drugs has risen faster than the level of clinical benefits received from these new 
drugs.  In these preceding chapters, it was established that Herceptin® and Avastin® are 
the most expensive breast and colorectal cancer treatments. These two drugs also generate 
the greatest clinical benefits. Figures, 10 and 11 relate drug prices with clinical benefits 
for metastatic and adjuvant breast treatments, respectively. For both disease indications, 
increased clinical benefits come at an increased price.  Figure 12 shows that the same 
relationship also applies to metastatic CRC drugs.   
 
Figure 10.  Price-Benefit Relationships for Drugs against Metastatic Breast Cancer  
Source:  Author’s correlation of clinical trial outcomes and total price of drugs (Tables 4 and 5)  
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Four of the drugs against metastatic breast cancer do not conform to the upward 
trend of increased price for increased clinical benefits (see Figure 10).  This apparent 
deviation arises from the indiscriminate grouping of all breast cancer drugs, without 
regard to disease sub-classifications.  For example, in the metastatic setting, the 
Aromatase inhibitors are grouped together with HER2-targeting therapies, despite 
profound differences in the type of patient and tumor subclass that the drug treats (FDA 
2001c; Genentech 2008c). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  45 
 
Figure 11.  Price-Benefit Relationships for Drugs used as Adjuvant Therapies for 
Breast Cancer  
Source:  Author’s correlation of clinical trial outcomes and total price of drugs (Table 6) 
 
The level of benefits received from the adjuvant treatments of breast cancer 
appears to conform to an exponential rise in price per clinical benefit4.  A similar 
relationship of steeply increasing drug prices for increased clinical benefits applies to new 
CRC treatments (Figure 12).  In both first and second-line treatments of metastatic CRC, 
the greatest survival gains come at a very high price.  Avastin® leads the CRC drugs in 
terms of price and benefits received.  The exponential trend for price per benefit suggests 
that the value of new anticancer drugs exceeds their clinical benefit.  Indeed, the clinical 
benefit of anticancer drugs is one component of the total value that anticancer drugs offer 
                                                
4 The data points in Figures 11 and 12 conform to exponential regression curves more 
closely than linear regression curves (Appendix III).   The same conclusion was not 
possible for drugs approved against metastatic breast cancers, due to extreme variations in 
subclasses of the disease and the small sample size. 
  46 
to society.  Other non-clinical benefits such as the ability of new drugs to enhance the 
quality of life also contribute.  One interesting non-clinical benefit under current 
discussion is the value of innovative new drugs against cancer, or the value of innovation 
(Berenson 2006). These non-clinical (or indirect) benefits are discussed in the following 
section. 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  Price-Benefit Relationships of New CRC Drugs 
Source:  Author’s correlation of trial outcomes and total price of drugs (Table 9) 
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6 Non-Clinical Benefits and Anticancer Drugs of the 
Future 
 
 
In the previous chapters, the trend for increasingly high prices for clinically beneficial 
therapeutics was established. This chapter includes a discussion on innovation and future 
anticancer drug prices.  We discuss the non-clinical benefits that new drugs offer, such as 
their ability to promote efficiency in healthcare budgeting, enhance the quality of life of 
cancer patients or promote further medical discoveries.  The chapter concludes with 
discussions towards the large social benefits earned from the innovation of anticancer 
drugs.  
Our findings in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 indicate that Herceptin® and Avastin® are the 
most effective and expensive anticancer drugs to be approved over the past decade.   There 
are significant indicators that future anticancer treatments will also have high prices 
(Dreyer 2006).  One example is the caliber of investment in diagnostics by the 
pharmaceutical manufacturer, Roche.  Roche has recently acquired the small diagnostics 
company Ventana Medical Systems for three billion US dollars in a hostile take-over 
(Unspecified Author #2 2007).  The acquisition is valuable for Roche as Ventana has 
developed a diagnostic test to determine if Roche’s drugs will work. Such an acquisition 
may indicate that future Roche products will be co-marketed with a diagnostic test, which 
confirms that a drug will be effective. Anticancer treatments of the future will likely 
include more diagnostic testing, as the treatments become more sophisticated (Pollack 
2006). 
  48 
Future medicines may also benefit society by providing efficiency gains to 
healthcare systems.    These indirect benefits may include the foregone costs of 
inappropriately prescribed drugs or the prevention of late-stage disease through more 
accurate detection methods (Aspinall and Hamermesh 2007).  Thus, efficiency gains 
should increase the total social benefits received from new anticancer drugs.  
 
 
6.1 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers: Pricing, Profits and R&D 
Expenses 
  
In the past, critics have justified high drug prices with arguments concerning the 
manufacturer’s need to recover high research and development (R&D) costs (Nagle 2007). 
Empirical evidence supports this argument (Grabowski et al 2002). Another argument for 
high drug prices is that the manufacturers need to mitigate the risk of failure during the 
development of new drugs (Scherer 2001).  
For those drugs that manage to achieve FDA approval, the chemotherapy market 
promises high returns.  The US chemotherapy market is now valued at $42 billion US 
dollars, and is rapidly expanding (Pijpers and Belsey 2006; Presswire 2006).   Herceptin® 
and Avastin®, generate substantial revenues for their manufacturer, Genentech. These two 
products have now earned Genentech over $16 billion (US) in combined product sales 
(Genentech 2007).  
Genentech appears to have earned high profits in relation to its R&D spending (see 
Figure 13).  The high ratio of profits to R&D spending at Genentech weakens the 
arguments of Grabowski et al (2002) and Scherer (2001). Indeed, contemporary analyses 
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indicate that profit to R&D spending ratios are greater for biotech companies than for 
pharmaceutical companies (DiMasi et al 2007).  Perhaps more importantly, the high 
profits that biotech companies retain may cause healthcare payers to question whether 
they are paying too much for these drugs. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13.  The Changing Ratio of R&D Expenditures to Product Sales at 
Genentech 
Source: Author’s representation of Genentech’s Annual Earnings Releases (Genentech 2008b) 
 
 
6.2 The Benefit of Innovation 
 
 
Genentech has publicly justified its pricing strategy for Avastin® by arguing that the drug 
is innovative and therefore worth the extra cost to healthcare systems (Berenson 2006). 
Genentech’s argument that innovation contributes to a drug’s value is interesting when 
viewed in the context of historical innovation of the anticancer drugs. Figure 14 illustrates 
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the connectedness and degree of scientific advancements made throughout the history of 
the innovations of anticancer drugs.   
In the 1960s, there was little reason to question the value of the early cytotoxics, 
which readily made their way into healthcare systems. The anticancer drugs of today have 
shifted from the “life-saving” drugs of the 20th century to “life-extending” drugs of the 21st 
century (Mason and Freemantle 1998; Rawlins 2007).   The value of innovativeness and 
other, less tangible, benefits are now established components of the total value of new 
drugs (Murphy and Topel 2005).  
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Figure 14. Tracking Innovation in the Anticancer Drugs 
Big steps in innovation are represented by bold curves.  Red double-ended arrows may estimate the relative size 
of advancement.  Innovative measures are judged by their relative similarity to previous discoveries. 
Source: Author’s illustration and knowledge of anticancer drugs 
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6.3 Competition and Pharmaceutical Innovation 
 
 
The development of innovative drugs gives the manufacturers a differentiation 
competitive advantage.   For example, drugs that are manufactured by unique methods, 
such as the biologic drugs (Herceptin® and Avastin®), face a relatively minor threat from 
competition by generic drugs (Grabowski and Kyle 2007). This is because the duplication 
of biologic drugs is not yet technically possible (Ziegelbauer and Light 2008). 
Healthcare systems encourage innovation through policies, such as reference 
pricing.  Reference pricing policies classify all drugs according to therapeutic or molecular 
equivalence (Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy 2000).  Manufacturers are free to set high 
prices for their drugs, however, reimbursement is limited for highly priced drugs that are 
of low novelty.  Truly novel drugs that are within their own therapeutic classification 
receive better reimbursement coverage.   Many drug manufacturers have stopped 
developing “me-too products” (of low novelty) in response to the recent implementation 
of reference pricing in the US (Farkas and Henske 2006). 
 
6.3.1 Marketing Strategies for New Anticancer Drugs 
 
The market segments that an anticancer drug may access correspond with the disease 
indications that a new drug has been approved for.  Thus, increasing the number of 
approved indications also increases the market potential for a new oncology drug. The 
strategies used by Genentech to market Herceptin® and Avastin® are two examples of 
strategies deployed within the chemotherapy market. 
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 In the first strategy, the drug relies on good clinical efficacy against one particular 
indication to gain market share.   The marketing of Herceptin® is a good example of this 
strategy.  Herceptin® is a narrow spectrum drug that works on a unique biomarker, 
specific for breast cancers.  Herceptin® is also very effective because of this specificity.  
The drug now dominates the HER2-positive segment of the breast cancer market.  The 
potential profits from Herceptin® sales are, however, limited because the drug is only 
effective on one specific sub-type of cancer.   
The strategy used by broad-spectrum drugs like Avastin® target all types of 
cancer, despite the primary location of the tumor.  Avastin®’s mode of action enables it to 
work on all types of cancer. Because the drug is able to work on any tumor type, Avastin® 
targets many market segments (see Figure 15). By sequentially gaining approval for 
different indications, the manufacturer increased the potential market size for Avastin® to 
almost 1,000,000 patients. Figure 15 illustrates the breadth of Avastin®’s market, based 
on the number of FDA applications made for this drug.  Broad-spectrum drugs, like 
Avastin®, may also lose market segments to narrow-spectrum drugs that are more 
effective.  
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Figure 15. Avastin®’s Market Expansion 
Source: Author’s calculations using SEER 2008 Cancer Statistics (SEER 2008) and Genentech’s 
development pipeline for Avastin® 
 
 
6.3.2  Quality of Life-Enhancing Drugs 
 
Another strategy used to market new anticancer drugs is to replace older, inexpensive 
drugs with a new, more expensive, re-formulation of the original active ingredient. These 
“quality of life-enhancing drugs” have contributed to the higher prices of new anticancer 
drugs (Schrag 2004).  However, in many instances, the more expensive new drugs also 
offer indirect cost advantages to healthcare systems.  
The replacement of 5-Flourouracil (5-FU) with a newer CRC drug, Xeloda®, is a 
good example.  Xeloda® uses the same active ingredient to fight cancer, however, the 
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drug comes as a pill form.  Unlike the older version, 5-FU, the pill form does not require 
intravenous administration in a hospital.  The use of Xeloda® is, therefore, cost-effective 
since hospital care and administration costs are foregone (Jansman et al 2007).   Although 
the replacement of old drugs with newer equivalents increases drug expenditures, the 
quality of life-enhancing drugs may also provide efficiency gains.   Therefore, evaluative 
measures should also include non-drug costs and non-clinical benefits of new anticancer 
treatments.  
 
 
6.4 Future Cancer Control Strategies 
 
 
Current anticancer research follows recent advancements in genomic and biochemical 
technology.  Prototypic personal genomic tests have already made their way through the 
approval process and into the public sector (Singer 2008).  Some US breast cancer patients 
now have the option to pay an extra $2500 for a diagnostic test that will determine the 
likelihood of the disease returning after surgery (Pollack 2006).  For this price, patients 
have a chance to avoid superfluous chemotherapy regimens. Healthcare systems may also 
avoid cytotoxic treatments that are more likely to cause harm to patients than to help them. 
Another area of advancement is the correlation of disease progression with 
biomarkers.  With this information, researchers may be able to tell which drug 
combination will be the most effective for a particular stage of disease.  This information 
will also enable oncologists to avoid those treatments that are not likely to have any effect 
on the disease (Yau et al 2008). 
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Without doubt, the price of tomorrow’s anticancer drugs will continue to rise as 
medical technology moves towards personalized medicines.  Cost-effectiveness analysis 
will need to become more transparent so that decision-makers are aware of the direct and 
indirect benefits of new treatments.  Patients can expect to receive therapies that are more 
clinically effective and less invasive. The integration of scientific advancements, increased 
social awareness and good medical care will contribute to the success of anticancer drugs 
in the future. Anticancer drugs will probably enter healthcare markets at higher prices.  
Healthcare landscapes will need to change in order to adopt anticancer drugs of the future. 
 
6.5 The Value of Innovative Anticancer Drugs:  Concluding 
Remarks 
 
 
 
New anticancer drugs offer great clinical benefits to society. Patients now survive longer 
than they did 20 years ago because of these drugs (Chia et al 2007). These clinical benefits 
now come at very high prices.  Healthcare systems increasingly pay more for anticancer 
drugs in nearly all cancer types (Warren et al 2008). The result presented within this 
project validates the relationship of increasingly high drug prices with gains in clinical 
benefits.  The underlying discussions in this chapter have acknowledged that clinical 
benefits are only a small fraction of the social benefits offered by new drugs.   
Other benefits, such as possible efficiency gains to health systems and quality of 
life-enhancements, contribute to the total social benefits. Despite the observed increase in 
health improvements, the steep rise in the price of new anticancer drugs has left critics 
with the concern that these expensive new drugs are not generating net social benefits. 
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Drug manufacturers have responded with arguments of the less tangible benefits 
offered by new anticancer drugs, such as the value of innovation. Indeed, there is good 
reason to believe that the innovation of new anticancer drugs is worth a very high price.   
Recently, Murphy and Topel (2006) have made a monetary estimate of how much 
Americans value health benefits (Murphy and Topel 2006).  Their estimate used an 
individual’s willingness to pay for drugs that would improve longevity for Americans with 
cardiovascular diseases and cancers.  The results of Murphy and Topel’s (2006) 
investigation are interesting.  The estimated value for gains in life expectancy was about 
1.2 million dollars per person. The authors further estimated that small reductions in 
cancer might be worth over $500 billion dollars in social value to future Americans.  
This large economic value should drive the innovation of more (expensive) 
anticancer drugs.   In fact, it will be difficult for manufacturers to keep up with the 
demand for new drugs against the disease.  Murphy and Topel (2007) now show that drug 
manufacturers are not innovating fast enough to keep up with the potential social gains 
(Murphy and Topel 2007). The authors suggest that current pharmaceutical R&D 
investments are too low, and that public and private contributions should increase. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers have the main interest of generating revenue and 
returns to shareholders.  Grabowski et al (2002) demonstrated the direct correlation of 
R&D investments to the number of pharmaceutical innovations that arise from these 
investments (Grabowski et al 2002).  Lichtenberg (2001) noted that future R&D 
investments result from current profits on sales to healthcare markets (Lichtenberg 2001). 
Healthcare decision-makers have the conflicting interest of maintaining control over 
pharmaceutical expenditures. 
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Due to the conflicting interests of pharmaceutical manufacturers and healthcare 
systems, it is difficult to say how future drugs will diffuse into healthcare systems. In this 
report, we established that the trend for increased clinical benefits corresponds with 
increasingly high prices for anticancer drugs.    We did not address the underlying issue of 
how healthcare systems will pay for these, increasingly expensive, drugs.   The issue of 
high drug prices must resolve in order for society to maximize the benefits of future 
anticancer drugs.     
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Appendix I 
 
FDA Approval History for Drugs against Breast Cancer 
Drug  
(Trade name®, 
generic name) 
Approval  
date 
L ine or  
type of  
therapy 
Specific Indicat ion  
Nolvadex®, 
tamoxifen 
01/31/86 Adjuvant As a single agent to delay breast cancer recurrence following surgery  
Nolvadex®, 
tamoxifen 
03/16/89 Adjuvant Metastatic breast cancer in premenopausal women 
Nolvadex®, 
tamoxifen 
06/21/90 Adjuvant Axillary node negative breast cancer 
Ellence®, 
epirubicin 
09/15/99 Adjuvant Following surgery in patients with axillary node involvement 
Taxol®, 
paclitaxel 
10/25/99 Adjuvant Node-positive breast cancer administered after doxorubicin combination 
therapy 
Arimidex®, 
anastrazole 
09/05/02* 
09/16/05** 
Adjuvant Hormone receptor positive postmenopausal women with early stage disease 
Aromasin® 
exemestane 
10/05/05 Adjuvant Postmenopausal Estrogen receptor positive  women with early breast cancer 
after two to three years of tamoxifen to complete five total years of adjuvant 
therapy hormonal therapy 
Femara®, 
letrozole 
10/29/04* Adjuvant 
(extended) 
Treatment of early breast cancer in postmenopausal women who have 
already received five years of adjuvant tamoxifen therapy 
Taxotere®, 
docetaxel 
08/18/04 Adjuvant 
 
Use with doxorubicin and cyclophosphamide for the adjuvant treatment of 
patients with operable node positive breast cancer 
Adriamycin®, 
Doxorubicin 
05/08/03 Adjuvant Use with cyclophosphamide, in patients with axillary node involvement after 
resection of primary breast cancer 
Herceptin®, 
Trastuzumab 
11/16/06 Adjuvant Early stage breast cancer after primary therapy 
Epirubicin, 
epirubicin 
09/15/06 Adjuvant,  Axillary node involvement after resection of primary breast cancer 
Nolvadex®, 
tamoxifen 
04/01/93 First Metastatic breast cancer in men 
Arimidex®, 
anastrazole 
09/01/00 First Postmenopausal women with Hormone receptor positive or unknown tumors 
and locally advanced or metastatic breast cancer 
Femara®, 
letrozole 
01/09/01 
01/17/03** 
First Postmenopausal women with Hormone receptor positive or unknown tumors 
and locally advanced or metastatic breast cancer 
Avastin®, 
bevacizumab 
02/22/08 First Metastatic HER2 negative breast cancer 
Herceptin®, 
Trastuzumab 
02/09/00 First Metastatic breast cancer in combination with paclitaxel for patients with 
HER2 positive tumors 
Teslac®, 
testolactone 
05/27/70 n/a breast 
Thioplex®, 
thiotepa 
12/22/94 n/a breast 
Aredia®, 
pamidronate 
09/22/98 n/a Osteolytic bone metastases originating from breast cancer in addition to 
standard forms of antineoplastic therapy 
Nolvadex®, 
tamoxifen 
12/30/77 Palliative Breast 
Zoladex 
Impant®, 
goserelin acetate 
12/18/95 Palliative Advanced breast cancer in pre- and perimenopausal women 
Nolvadex®,  
tamoxifen 
10/29/98 Risk  
reduction 
For reducing the incidence of breast cancer in women who are at a high risk 
of contracting the disease 
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Nolvadex®, 
tamoxifen®, 
tamoxifen 
06/29/00 Risk 
Reduction 
For use in DCIS diagnosed women after surgery and radiation to reduce the 
risk of invasive breast cancer developing 
Evista®, 
raloxifene 
hydrochloride 
09/13/07 Risk 
reduction 
Postmenopausal women with osteoporosis and reduction in risk of invasive 
breast cancer in postmenopausal women at high risk for invasive breast 
cancer 
Taxol®, 
paclitaxol 
04/13/94 Second Treatment of breast cancer after failure of previous chemotherapy or 
relapse of disease before 6 months of adjuvant chemotherapy  
Taxotere®, 
docetaxel 
07/27/94* 
06/22/98 ** 
Second Advanced or metastatic breast cancer who have failed after or relased 
during of anthracycline-based therapy 
Arminidex®, 
anastrazole 
12/27/95 Second Treatment of advanced breast cancer in postmenopausal women whose 
disease has progressed after tamoxifen therapy 
Fareston®, 
toremifene 
05/29/97 Second Advanced breast cancer in postmenopausal women 
Femara®, 
letrozole 
06/25/97 Second Advanced breast cancer in postmenopausal women 
Aromasin®, 
exemestane 
10/21/99 Second Advanced breast cancer in post menopausal women after tamoxifen 
Abraxane®, 
paclitaxel 
protein-bound 
particles 
01/07/05 Second Metastatic, after failure of combination therapy or relapse within 6 months 
of adjuvant chemotherapy 
Gemzar®, 
gemcitabine 
05/19/04 Second Metastatic breast cancer after failure of anthracycline adjuvant 
chemotherapy 
Tykerb®, 
Lapatinib, 
ditosylate 
03/13/07 Second Use with capectiabine for advanced or metastatic HER2+ tumors who have 
received prior therapy including an anthracycline, taxane and trastuzumab 
Herceptin®, 
trastuzumab 
09/25/98 Second,  
Third 
Metastatic breast cancer when tumors express the HER2 protein and who 
have received one or more chemotherapy regimes, (anthracyline-based 
and/or paclitaxel) 
Faslodex®, 
fulvestrant 
05/25/02 Second,  
subsequent 
Hormone receptor positive, postmenopausal women with disease 
progression after antiestrogen therapy 
Xeloda®, 
capectibine 
04/30/98* 
09/07/01** 
Second, 
third 
Metastatic breast cancer for patients after receiving both anthracycline and 
paclitaxel therapy or high cumulative doses of doxorubicin. 
Source: Author’s representation and retrieval of data from the FDA website 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/onctools/Indicationlist.cfm?Indication=breast 
*accelerated approval 
**full approval 
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Appendix II 
 
FDA Approval History for Drugs against Colorectal Cancer 
Drug  
(Trade name®, 
generic name) 
Approval 
date 
Line or 
type of 
therapy 
Specific Indication 
Adrucil®, 
Fluorouracil,  
04/25/62 n/a Colon-rectum 
Ergamisol®, 
levamisolee 
06/18/90 adjuvant Adjuvant treatment in combination with 5-FU after surgical resection in patients 
with Dukes’ Stage C colon cancer 
Leucovorin®, 
leucovorin 
12/12/91 palliative In combination with 5-FU to prolong survival in the palliative treatment of 
patients with advanced colorectal cancer 
Camptosar®, 
irinotecan 
06/14/96* 
10/22/98** 
Second Treatment of patients with metastatic carcinoma of the colon or rectum whose 
disease has recurred or progressed following 5-FU-based therapy 
Camptosar®, 
irinotecan 
04/20/00 
 
First Treatment of patients with metastatic carcinoma of the colon or rectum whose 
disease has recurred or progressed following 5-FU-based therapy 
Xeloda®, 
capectibine 
04/30/01 First Metastatic colorectal in combination with 5-FU  
Eloxatin®, 
oxaliplatin 
08/09/02 Second Metastatic Recurrent, after resection, 5-FU/LV and irinotecan; In combination 
with 5-FU 
Eloxatin®, 
oxaliplatin 
01/09/04 First In combination with 5-FU and Leucovorin (LV) for the treatment of patients 
previously untreated for advanced/metastatic colorectal cancer 
Erbitux®, 
cetuximab 
02/12/04* 
10/02/07** 
Second EGFR-expressing metastatic colorectal carcinoma in combination with 
irinotecan for refractory patients or as a single agent in patients who are 
intolerant to irinotecan-based chemotherapy 
Avastin®, 
bevacizumab 
02/26/04 First Metastatic CRC in combination with 5-FU/LV 
Avastin®, 
bevacizumab 
06/20/06 Second Metastatic CRC in combination with FOLFOX 
 
Erbitux®, 
cetuximab 
02/10/07 First Advanced CRC 
Source: Author’s representation and retrieval of data from the FDA website 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/onctools/Indicationlist.cfm?Indication=colon-rectum 
*accelerated approval 
**full approval 
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Appendix III 
 
Regression Analysis for Figures 10 and 11 
 
Regression Analyses of Figure 10, Price-Benefit Relationship of Adjuvant Breast 
Cancer Drugs 
The data points for adjuvant breast treatments conforms more closely to exponential regression (green 
dashed) than linear (solid black).  An R2 value close to one indicates the closeness of this fit 
 
Regression Analyses of Figure 11. Price-Benefit Relationship Drugs against 
Metastatic CRC 
The data points for metastatic colorectal cancer treatments conform more closely to exponential regression 
(green dashed) than linear (solid black) in both first and second-line treatments. 
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